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A Technical Field Manager (TFM) from MAG completes his Evidence Log during an assessed site investigation during the GICHD Accident Investigation Course at the
Regional School for Humanitarian Demining Lebanon (RSHDL) in June 2019. The primacy of evidence in the investigative process is one of the key changes in the new
IMAS 10.60.
Image courtesy of Ahmad Doghman.
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n 2019, the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian

The drafting team had a clear vision of how the original IMAS could

Demining (GICHD) received permission from the International

be improved. Firstly, and possibly most importantly, the importance of

Mine Action Standard (IMAS) Review Board (RB) to update IMAS

evidence in the investigation process needed to be emphasized. In the

10.60, Safety & occupational health – Investigation and reporting of

old version, evidence was only mentioned three times. In the new ver-

accidents and incidents. The first edition of the document, originally

sion, it is mentioned eighty-one times. As the new introduction clearly

drafted in October 2001 and last amended in June 2013, included a

states, “an investigation involves the identification, collection, record-

number of areas where significant improvement was possible. In light

ing and analysis of evidence.”2 Throughout, the document emphasizes

of this, the IMAS RB established a Technical Working Group (TWG)

the need to identify all relevant types of evidence: physical evidence,

in October 2019 to enable nominated representatives to feed into the

witness statements, and documentary evidence. The linking of factual

drafting process. The original TWG included representatives from

statements to supporting evidence in report writing is also stressed.

MAG, HALO, NPA, ICRC, HI, Afghanistan DMAC, Tetra Tech, CISR,

The document states that “investigators should be able to show not

PM/WRA, and independent members.1 In time, UNMAS and the mili-

only that conclusions are strictly aligned with evidence but that all

tary representative on the IMAS RB joined the TWG.

relevant evidence has been identified and collected in a competent
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A TFM from MAG records crater measurements in the course of an assessed site investigation during the GICHD Accident Investigation Course at the RSHDL in June
2019. Post Blast Investigation including crater analysis was not included in this IMAS due to size limitations but could be a candidate for a supporting technical document, such as a Technical Note for Mine Action (TNMA) in the future.
Image courtesy of Ahmad Doghman.
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manner. Evidence shall be rigorously recorded and secured so that an

a formal investigation.” Commencing an external investigation ten

investigation can be subsequently analyzed if required.” Even simple

days after an accident or incident would, in all likelihood, inherently

mechanisms can help with this process, such as the inclusion of a basic

undermine such an investigation, since it would have little chance of

evidence log as an annex for the first time and the inclusion of basic

effectively processing evidence from the scene. This is no longer the

forensic awareness procedures.

case in the new edition.

Another key improvement is the simplification of the reporting

The new version also introduces a new system of different inves-

timeline following an incident or accident. The previous IMAS split the

tigation levels. Internal investigations are now termed 1st Party

Initial Report for any incident or accident into two parts. This was con-

Investigations. Those conducted by the NMAA, including Boards of

fusing, so a change was made to have three clearly separate reports. An

Inquiry (BOI), are termed 2nd Party Investigations. Investigations

Immediate Report will be generated in the minutes after an accident by

completely independent of both the mine action organization in

the team on site, providing key details for the mobilization of support.

question, and the NMAA, are now termed 3rd Party. Ideally, acci-

Then, within twenty-four hours, the organization that experienced an

dents involving either a fatality or serious injury would be subject

accident or incident will produce an Initial Report, providing strictly

to at least a 2nd or 3rd Party Investigation; however, the IMAS rec-

factual information about the accident/incident known to date. Within

ognized this is not always practicable. In circumstances where no

ten days, a Lead Investigator will produce a Detailed Report, ideally

NMAA exists, mine action organizations may find that a 1st Party

mandated by an agreed terms of reference (ToR) from the National

Investigation is the only means of investigation available. In such

Mine Action Authority (NMAA). The aim of this Detailed Report is to

instances, mine action organizations shall fully record the circum-

provide a comprehensive analysis, rigorously supported by evidence,

stances in their internal ToR mandating the investigation. There

of what happened and why it happened. Another aspect of the timeline

is still scope for mine action organizations to conduct a 1st Party

that was changed was the old stipulation that enabled the “demining

Investigation even when an NMAA has initiated a 2nd or 3rd Party

incident detailed report” (also to be completed in ten days) to “precede

Investigation. However, the 2nd or 3rd Party Investigation should
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have primary control of any accident site as well as all relevant physical and documentary evidence. In short, a 1st Party Investigation
shall not compromise or interfere in any way with any ongoing or
expected 2nd or 3rd Party Investigation.
This IMAS is the first to introduce concepts of causal analysis, albeit
in a simple, straightforward manner. Causes are initially classified as
immediate or underlying. Immediate causes tend to be those directly
linked to the scene of the accident, such as behavior and worksite conditions. Underlying causal analysis tends to look more at management
and organizational factors. The inclusion of underlying causal analysis
was one of the key developments in the drafting process. The intent
is to encourage organizations to look beyond specific actions on site,
and to focus on organizational and managerial factors that could have
contributed to the accident or incident. Invariably, the explanations
are complex and not only found on site or with the conduct of those
immediately involved. Causal analysis is difficult, since inevitably it
entails organizations looking closely at themselves and their ways of
working. Nevertheless, there was significant support from the TWG
for a greater emphasis on causal analysis; this good practice can now
hopefully become standardized for all.
The locations of demining and mine accidents and incidents3 are
usually dangerous places. They are also the locations where most of
the physical evidence is found. Such locations have to be processed by
individuals with suitable levels of training and experience. For the first
time, IMAS 10.60 now lists preferred requirements for those conducting site investigations. While not listing specific qualifications, investigation requirements implicitly necessitate experienced and qualified
personnel. The IMAS recommends specific accident and incident
investigation training for those who might be called upon to fulfill
such a task. As yet, there is no set of agreed competencies that such a

A TFM from MAG conducts a fingertip search of a small crater looking for evidence
in the course of an assessed site investigation during the GICHD Accident Investigation Course at the RSHDL in June 2019.
Image courtesy of Ahmad Doghman.

course would potentially teach. It is possible that the development of

The TWG also addressed the language used for report writing.

such competencies could be recognized as a natural progression for

Individuals can often intend slightly different meanings to adjectives

this IMAS in the future.

that describe a level of confidence in an assertion. For example, what

Another area where the drafting team was particularly keen to see

is likely for one report writer might just be possible for another. In

progress was the inclusion of Near Miss reporting. The term Near Miss

an attempt to at least start addressing this subjective approach, the

refers to an incident that, while not causing harm, has the potential

IMAS introduced standard confidence levels. Five levels, with associ-

to cause injury or ill health. This definition was also added to IMAS

ated percentages, are suggested by means of a should statement. These

04.10, Glossary of Terms. It might be described as a form of incident,

are Certain (>90%), Likely (75%–90%), Possible (40%–60%), Unlikely

although in this IMAS it is effectively treated as a separate category

(10%–25%), and Remote (<10%). The use of such language for indica-

of event. Within other industries such as aviation, Near Miss report-

tive probability does not, of course, preclude a subjective approach by

ing has been systematized for decades. Within mine action, possibly

any report writer. However, it may be seen as a step toward making

due to individuals and organizations being fearful of the consequences

the language used by report writers more objective. A future revision

of admitting Near Misses, such reporting is limited. Some organiza-

of this IMAS might look at the percentage levels so that the complete

tions have made significant efforts in this direction in recent years. For

percentage range is covered.

example, Tetra Tech has a mobile application that allows staff to elec-

Other new aspects of the IMAS include a short section on cogni-

tronically report Near Misses quickly and in a standardized format.

tive bias. The intent here is to improve awareness among both inves-

The system is not abused as a means of undermining the chain of com-

tigators and organizations about the universal potential to exhibit

mand and has engendered important internal improvements. Near

some form of cognitive bias. A number of organizations already have

Miss reporting is mandated by a should statement in the new IMAS

good peer review procedures for their accident and incident report-

draft; it is not a shall requirement. At present, mine action organiza-

ing, including the use of external expertise. It is hoped that, within

tions and NMAAs are encouraged to set up credible Near Miss report-

the confines of applicable data protection legislation, and subject to

ing that does not penalize those who are willing to admit fault. In the

suitable non-disclosure agreements, such reviews become increas-

future, it is hoped that such an approach becomes commonplace.

ingly standardized.
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A student takes his final evidence layout images during an assessed task on the GICHD Accident Investigation Course, Thun, Switzerland, August 2020.
Image courtesy of Edison Pineda.

While full implementation of the IMAS will take time, the GICHD

This article briefly summarizes some of the main changes to IMAS

is already mindful of how the document may evolve when it comes to

10.60. The previous IMAS of 8,504 words became a new one of 13,790.

potential amendments. For example, greater clarity is possible when

This involved not just new material but a thorough revision of the

distinguishing between the should requirement to report Near Misses

existing text. Essentially this is almost an entirely new document. It is

and the shall requirement to report incidents. Some have requested

now one of the longest IMAS in the series. While it represents a sig-

revised percentages for the confidence levels used. The format of the

nificant change for the mine action sector, it is a change supported by

Detailed Report could be developed further. A number of the TWG

the main industry actors represented on the IMAS RB, with no votes

members are keen for a central repository for accident reporting to be

against the second edition of the document. This IMAS has already

mandated by an amended IMAS in the future. If work progresses on

been adopted by key operators such as MAG, who have fully updated

establishing such a database, it can then be assessed by the IMAS RB.

their Accident Investigation standard operating procedures accord-

As with all desired amendments, the drafting must balance the need

ingly. The overall aim is for the sector to improve collectively, so that

to make valid changes with the need not to overburden field operators

we discharge our responsibilities to field staff by learning as much as

with ever-increasing requirements. Hopefully an acceptable balance

practicable when an adverse event occurs. The drafting team hope that

can be found that ensures this IMAS will serve, rather than hinder,

this IMAS, at least in part, contributes to achieving that aim.

those who implement it. In any case, it is likely that this IMAS will
be amended in some way relatively soon. The standard 12–18-month
review for all new IMAS, recently introduced by the RB, provides the
ideal opportunity for this, as is intended.
The causal analysis section of the document is already a candidate
for minor change when the next IMAS amendment is conducted. Lead
Investigators at present only should be able to conduct causal analysis. In
the future, this might change into a shall requirement. The factors for both
immediate and underlying causes could also be revised. For instance, the
addition of a specific equipment factor would add clarity rather than this
factor being included within a more general title of “worksite conditions.”
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